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THE WTO LAW ON SUBSIDIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE: 
OVERCOMING THE DISSONANCE? 
AVIDAN KENT* 
 
 
The worrisome rise in the number of trade disputes relating to climate change 
policies leaves no doubt as to the relevance of WTO law to climate change 
policies. Perhaps the most contentious aspect of the relationship between trade 
law and climate change policies is the issue of subsidies — while many climate 
change policies rely heavily on the use of subsidies, WTO law considers subsidies 
a distortive force and aspires to limit the use of such measures. This article 
evaluates the compatibility of several climate change programs in light of the 
WTO law on subsidies. It argues that the current legal framework is unsuitable 
for the promotion of climate change abatement objectives. This is because relevant 
considerations such as the urgency of the climate change problem, the many 
market failures embedded in climate-friendly goods and services, and the political 
reality currently abundant in many states, are entirely disregarded by the WTO 
law on subsidies. The recent Canada FIT Panel and Appellate Body Reports 
seem to accept this critique, and consequently present a modified approach to the 
interaction between the WTO law on subsidies and the climate change challenge. 
Another promising route of action can be found in the model reflected in an 
agreement recently concluded between the EU and China, in which, prima facie, 
the parties decided to include non-commercial considerations as relevant for their 
own trading relations. These two recent developments may signify a change in the 
approach towards the interaction between trade law and climate change, as well 
as a realisation that the current legal framework should be re-evaluated.   
                                                     
* LL.M. (McGill), Ph.D. Candidate (Cambridge University), Associate Fellow and the 
coordinator of the Trade, Investment and Finance research programme at the Centre for 
International Sustainable Development Law. This article is based on the author’s Ph.D. 
research work. E-mail: avidankent[at]gmail.com. The usual disclaimer applies.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Climate change under the WTO: The boiling point has been reached 
 
The interaction between trade law and climate change policies has never been so 
contentious. Attempts made by States to address climate change are met with 
challenges concerning the compatibility of these policies with WTO law. Such 
claims have been raised in the past concerning policies such as the newly 
introduced Australian carbon tax and Emission Trading System (“ETS”), the EU’s 
enhancement of its own ETS (especially its application to the aviation sector, and 
possibly also to the shipping sector); the United States’ (“US”) support policies for 
biofuels; the European Union’s (“EU”) policies on bio-fuels (mainly concerning 
sustainability criteria); China’s subsidisation of the production of equipment related 
to renewable energy (“RE”); the EU’s intention to label Canadian oil as highly 
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polluting, and feed-in tariffs (“FIT”) programs adopted by Canada (the Province of 
Ontario), India, as well as several US and European states.1  
In the last few years the boiling point has been reached as some of these claims 
have evolved into open trade disputes, or are at the verge of becoming so. For 
example, the US has recently decided to impose countervailing duties (“CVDs”) on 
the importation of Chinese-made solar panels, claiming that these were unlawfully 
subsidised.2 Similarly, the EU has claimed that the US’ own subsidies on biodiesel 
are contrary to WTO law, and unilaterally retaliated with the imposition of CVDs 
on the importation of US biodiesel for a period of five years.3 In 2011, the 
American Soybean Association “expressed its concerns” regarding the EU’s 
Renewable Energy Directive, as soybean biodiesel does not fulfil the sustainability 
conditions set by the Directive, and therefore does not qualify for EU fuel-tax 
reductions or exemptions. This incident may possibly mature into yet another trade 
dispute.4 Recently, the EU decided to impose anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties 
on Chinese-made solar panels, claiming that these were sold far below their market 
                                                     
1 See for example, Joshua Meltzer, Climate Change and Trade – The EU Aviation Directive and the 
WTO 15(1) J.  INT’L ECON. L. 111 (2012); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, STEVE CHARNOVITZ 
& JISUN KIM, GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 89 (2009) 
[hereinafter HUFBAUER, CHARNOVITZ & KIM]; Commission Regulation No. 194/2009, 
2009 O.J. (L 67) 50, available at 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:067:0050:0084:EN:PD
F [hereinafter Commission Regulation No. 194/2009]; Consultations, European Union and 
Certain Member States – Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures 
Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, DS459, (May 15, 2013),  [hereinafter EU Biofuels]; Damian 
Carrington, Canada threatens trade war with EU over tar sands, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 20, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/feb/20/canada-eu-tar-sands; Tom 
Miles, India question U.S. green energy incentives at WTO, REUTERS, Apr. 17, 2013, available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/17/us-india-usa-trade-
idUKBRE93G11U20130417; Concerning disputes between the US and China, see infra 
Part II(D)(2); Concerning the dispute between Canada and the EU & Japan, see infra Part 
II(D)(1).  
2 Fact sheet: Commerce Preliminary Finds Countervailable Subsidization of Crystalline Silicon 
Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules from the People’s Republic of China, INT’L. 
TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T. OF COM. (Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-prc-solar-cells-adcvd-prelim-
20120320.pdf; Washington Announces Final Duties on Chinese Solar Cells, INT’L. CTR. FOR 
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Oct. 15, 2012), http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/147229/.   
3 Commission Regulation No. 194/2009, supra note 1. 
4 ASA Expresses Concerns about EU Renewable Energy Directive to ESDA and USTR, AM. 
SOYBEAN ASS’N (Mar. 9, 2011), http://soygrowers.com/asa-expresses-concerns-about-eu-
renewable-energy-directive-to-usda-and-ustr/ [hereinafter AM. SOYBEAN ASS’N]. 
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value.5 However, this dispute has been resolved amicably for the time being.6 
Four of these disputes, namely the US-China dispute concerning the subsidisation 
of RE equipment (complaints have been made by both parties on this matter); the 
China-EU disputes concerning measures adopted by several EU Member States; 
the US-India dispute concerning India’s support scheme for solar energy,7 and the 
Argentina-EU dispute concerning the EU’s biofuel policies, are currently being 
adjudicated under the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (“WTO DSB”).8 In another 
dispute between Japan and the EU on one side, and Canada on the other, 
concerning Ontario’s FIT program, an Appellate Body Report has been issued.9  
All of the disputes described above share a commonality: they are all related to 
subsidies. This is perhaps unsurprising; while climate change policies require heavy 
public investment, the general attitude towards subsidies under WTO law is 
restrictive. Therefore, the interaction between the WTO law on subsidies and 
climate change policies demands academic attention, especially in light of the 
recent developments described in this article, which emphasise the effect of 
international trade law on certain kinds of industrial and environmental policies. 
B. The Dissonance 
 
The International Law Commission Report on the Fragmentation of International 
Law has sparked a debate on the interaction between the different fields of 
international law.10 It is argued, inter alia, that specialised self-contained legal 
                                                     
5 Press Release, European Commission, EU imposes definitive measures on Chinese solar 
panels, confirms undertaking with Chinese solar panel exporters (Dec. 2, 2013), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1190_en.htm [hereinafter Memorandum from 
Eur. Comm’n].  
6 Id. 
7 Consultations, India – Certain measures relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, DS456, (Feb. 
6, 2013).  
8 Panel Composed, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products 
from China, DS449, (Mar. 4, 2013), [hereinafter United States-Countervailing Duties];  
Consultations, European Union and certain Member States-Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector, DS452, (Nov. 5, 2012); EU Biofuels, supra note 1. 
9 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, 
WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R (May 6, 2013) [hereinafter AB Report, Canada 
FIT]; Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector, DS412, (adopted May 24, 2013) [hereinafter AB Report, Canda—Renewable 
Energy]. 
10 Rep. of the Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of International Law, 58th Sess., 
May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, available at 
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regimes and institutions have developed autonomously, each designed to deal with 
specific interests.11 It is further claimed that on some occasions, these legal regimes 
have developed in isolation from other parallel fields.12 The interaction between 
international trade law and climate change law serves as a striking example of such 
fragmentation. The trade delegations operating under the WTO are expected to 
achieve economic gains for their governments, most notably better market access 
for their national industry, based on reciprocal trading concessions. The leading 
concept of the trading system is similar to that of the capitalist system – if each 
state will pursue its own interests, the greater good (i.e. prosperity for all) will be 
achieved. There is no doubt today that international trade is affecting, and being 
affected by, climate change.13 However, while the trading system has proved itself 
capable of improving the economic well-being of billions around the world, can it 
also positively engage with non-economic goals such as the mitigation of climate 
change? 
    
The author’s principal argument in this article is that the attempts to address 
climate change objectives through the WTO have created a dissonance (or even a 
“cognitive dissonance”14). When asked to promote climate change objectives (or at 
least not to frustrate them), the free trade ideology conflicts with the aspiration to 
achieve a non-economic goal; one that requires a global, coordinated response, and 
by definition imposes costs on the actors rather than rewarding them with 
commercial gains.  
 
The author does not question the fact that the global trading system is supportive 
of some elements related to climate change polices. Indeed, by reducing trade 
barriers and preventing ‘protectionism’, climate friendly technologies will achieve a 
better global distribution, the production of climate friendly goods will become 
cheaper, and their end prices will be lower. The author believes, however, that at 
                                                                                                                                  
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf [hereinafter ILC 
Report].  
11 Id. ¶ 15; Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation And Unity: International Law As A Universe 
Of Inter-Connected Islands, 25(4) MICH. J. INT'L L. 903 (2004) [hereinafter Pauwelyn, Bridging 
fragmentation and unity]. 
12 ILC Report, supra note 10, ¶ 8; Pauwelyn, Bridging fragmentation and unity, supra note 11, at 
903; Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, 25 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 849 (2004). 
13 WORLD TRADE ORG. & UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, TRADE AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE: WTO-UNEP REPORT (2009), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf. 
14 Cognitive Dissonance, SCI. DAILY, 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/articles/c/cognitive_dissonance.htm (stating that the 
psychological term “Cognitive Dissonance” represents an uncomfortable tension created 
“from engaging in a behaviour that conflicts with one’s beliefs”). 
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least with respect to the law on subsidies, the nature of the climate change problem 
requires a temporary deviation from this system. This deviation can be achieved 
only once the dissonance has been resolved. 
    
Until the year 2000 this dissonance had been partly addressed through the use of 
exceptions. However, these exceptions are no longer valid and no alternative 
solution has been adopted since. Moreover, due to the political sensitivity of this 
matter, the approach of leading figures such as the former WTO Secretary-General 
Pascal Lamy is that the issue of climate change should not be addressed by the 
WTO, at least not until a global consensus is achieved under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).15 Such an approach 
however, ignores the urgency of the climate change problems, and the fact that a 
meaningful agreement is not likely to be achieved under the UNFCCC in the near 
future. This approach also overlooks the immediate effect that trade policies have 
on the objectives of climate change policies. Therefore the international 
community must react in order to align the work of the international trading 
system with the objectives of climate change abatement policies. 
This article evaluates the interaction between the WTO law on subsidies and the 
objectives of climate change policies. In Part II, the conflict between the 
importance of subsidies to climate change policies on the one hand, and the 
unfavourable approach of trade law towards subsidies on the other, will be 
explained. It will be claimed in this part that a “dissonance” exists, as the objectives 
of trade law are ideologically and instrumentally conflicting with those of climate 
change policies. A brief introduction of the WTO law on subsidies will be 
provided, followed by a legal analysis of the compatibility of several types of 
climate change policies with WTO law. In Part IV, this article will conclude with 
several critical remarks regarding this interaction, and a few suggestions concerning 
the way forward. 
II. THE WTO LAW ON SUBSIDIES AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE 
CHALLENGE 
A.  Introduction 
 
In order to meet the obligations and goals set by international climate change 
agreements and declarations, many states have adopted appropriate domestic 
                                                     
15 See P.K. RAO, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE 
24 (2012). 
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climate change policies.16 These policies include national support schemes designed 
for the development and the promotion of Renewable Energy (“RE”). As in many 
cases investment in climate-friendly technologies is considered uneconomical, 
most of these support schemes are designed to overcome existing market failures 
through the granting of what can be defined as ‘subsidies’. What is a ‘subsidy’? 
There are numerous definitions, broad and narrow, for this term. The online 
Oxford Dictionary defines a ‘subsidy’ as “a sum of money granted to support an 
undertaking held to be in the public interest.”17 In the context of climate change, 
subsidies can appear as direct expenditure on the production of climate change 
goods; direct expenditure made for the research and development of new 
technologies; loan guarantees; tax credits; feed-in-tariff programs, and more.18  
The way in which states attempt to rectify market failures and support the 
production of public goods related to climate change can be explained through the 
example of feed-in tariffs programs (“FIT”). A FIT usually aims to support the 
producers of RE by guaranteeing competitive prices for long-term periods. By 
doing so, FITs can reduce several types of risks.19 From the standpoint of 
investors in renewable energy, price risks are reduced due to the fixed tariffs that 
protect producers from price volatilities, and volume risks are reduced due to the 
state’s obligation to purchase the electricity produced. Furthermore, these reduced 
risks also cut the cost of the capital required for investment in RE, and 
consequently also the total costs of investment in RE. Therefore, FITs are popular 
with new, small-scale entrepreneurs that do not have sufficient capital or the 
                                                     
16 Until 2011, 119 countries have adopted support plans, almost a 100% increase from the 
numbers in 2005. See UN ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL TRENDS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY 
INVESTMENT 2011: ANALYSIS OF TRENDS AND ISSUES IN THE FINANCING OF RENEWABLE 
ENERGY (2011), available at 
http://www.unep.org/publications/contents/pub_details_search.asp?ID=6226. 
17 Subsidy, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/subsidy. 
18 For a complete list of possible subsidies, see Andrew Green, Trade Rules and Climate 
Change Subsidies, 5(3) WORLD TRADE REV. 377  (2006)  [hereinafter Green,  Trade rules and 
climate change subsidies]; Doug Koplow, Subsidies in the US Energy Sector: Magnitude, Causes, and 
Options for Reform EARTH TRACK (2007), http://earthtrack.net/documents/subsidies-us-
energy-sector-magnitude-causes-and-options-reform [hereinafter Koplow, Subsidies in the 
US Energy Sector]; U.S. Dep’T of Energy, Energy Info. Admin. Office of Coal, Nuclear, 
Electric & Alternate Fuels, Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy Markets 2007, 
SR/CNEAF/2008-1 (April 2008),   http://docs.wind-watch.org/eia-subsidy08.pdf 
[hereinafter EIA Report, 2008]; see also Robert Howse,  Climate Mitigation Subsidies and the 
WTO Legal Framework: A Policy Analysis INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., 5, 7 (May 
2010), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/bali_2_copenhagen_subsidies_legal.pdf [hereinafter 
Howse]. 
19 C. Mitchel et al., Effectiveness Through Risk Reduction: A Comparison Of The Renewable 
Obligation In England And Wales And The Feed-In System In Germany, 34(3) ENERGY POL’Y 
297, 301 (2006). 
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advanced technology necessary to make such investments under free-market 
conditions.20 Indeed, among EU states in which FITs have been used as the main 
support scheme, rates of deployment of solar, wind and biogas technologies have 
been relatively high.21  
Other examples of subsidies designed to overcome the obstacles faced by the 
private sector include schemes such as green premiums, tax exemptions and direct 
expenditures. Green premiums and tax exemptions, for example, increase RE 
producers’ returns, and thus also the competitiveness of this source of energy. 
Direct expenditures made to producers or for R&D activity have the same effect. 
Subsidies are also given in order to compensate domestic industries, for which 
compliance with climate change regulation imposes a heavy financial burden. Such 
subsidisation is important in order to assist carbon-intensive industries to maintain 
their international competitiveness. While this may tantamount to protectionism at 
first glance, it should be remembered that due to phenomena such as carbon-
leakage and the lack of a level international playing-field (when it comes to climate 
change regulation), without sufficient compensation, climate change regulation 
may result in no global reduction in emissions being achieved, and with economic 
loss to the regulating country.22 It can also be argued that without ways to soften 
the impact on domestic emitters, the political will to enact environmental 
                                                     
20 According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, in 2010, 86% of the investment in small-
scale solar projects was made following the introduction of FIT programmes; see  Renewables 
2011: Global Status Report, REN21: RENEWABLE ENERGY POL’Y NETWORK FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 36, http://www.ren21.net/. For example, in Japan and Greece, a significant 
surge in small-scale PV projects was specifically attributed to the introduction of FIT. See 
Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2013, FRANKFURT SCH. – UNEP CTR. 50, 52   
http://www.unep.org/pdf/GTR-UNEP-FS-BNEF2.pdf; See also GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 
2013, REN21: RENEWABLE ENERGY POL’Y NETWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 25,  
http://www.ren21.net/Portals/0/documents/Resources/GSR 
/2013/GSR2013_lowres.pdf. In the United Kingdom, the adoption of the FIT program in 
2010 led to the registration of nearly 380, 000 RE installations, the vast majority of which 
are small-scaled; see Feed-in tariff update, OFGEM E-SERVE (June 2013), available at 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/75735/feed-tariff-update-quarterly-
report-issue-12.pdf.   
21 Commission Staff Working Document on the support of electricity from renewable energy sources, 8, 
SEC (2008) 57 (Jan. 23, 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/climate_actions/doc/2008_res_working_document_en.pdf.  
22 Regulated industry may migrate to less regulated countries; see Peter Wooders et al.,  
Addressing Competitiveness, Leakage and Climate Change: Options for Policy-Makers, INT’L INST. 
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (October 2009), 
http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id=1206. 
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regulation is likely to be less.23 
The political context in which climate-related subsidies are being adopted is indeed 
highly relevant for this discussion. The recent economic crisis has led many 
governments to invest large sums of money in domestic industry to revitalise their 
economies. These investments are often made as green stimulus packages, which 
are usually aimed at promoting local environmental friendly industry, and thereby 
supporting both environmental and domestic economic goals. While it is 
encouraging to see that public resources are being dedicated to the promotion of 
environmental goods, it is doubtful that these heavy investments would have been 
made if it was not for the economic benefits achieved by them for domestic 
economies.    
To conclude, it can be seen that subsidies can be an efficient tool, both politically 
and economically, for achieving the objectives of climate change regimes. It could 
therefore be expected that the WTO’s regulation of subsidies will explicitly address 
such subsidies, their unique character and the special role they are aimed to fulfil. 
However, as explained below, this is not always the case. 
B. Subsidies under Trade Law 
The general approach towards subsidies under international trade law is restrictive. 
Subsidies are considered as distorting the free market and granting advantages to 
manufacturers that are not necessarily the most efficient. Furthermore, the 
traditional WTO approach towards subsidies is also blind to policy-objectives and 
surrounding circumstances that led to the imposition of subsidies. This approach 
has been described in the following words:24 
“Generally, the motive for a subsidy is something that the ASCM does not 
take into account; the agreement treats subsidies to prevent market failure 
with the same rules as it treats subsidies to redistribute income.”  
The WTO’s blindness to the surrounding circumstances and rationales that are 
specific to each subsidy was criticised by authors such as Sykes, Cosbey and 
Howse, who argue that it could be that the WTO law on subsidies fails to make 
the distinction between harmful subsidies and those aimed at correcting market-
failures and encouraging the production of public goods.25 
                                                     
23 Luca Rubini, Ain’t wastin’ time no more: Subsidies for renewable energy, the SCM Agreement, policy 
space, and law reform, 15(2) J. INT’L ECON. LAW 525, 551(2012) [hereinafter Rubini, Ain’t 
wastin’ time]. 
24 HUFBAUER, CHARNOVITZ & KIM, supra note 1. .  
25 Howse, supra note 18; Aaron Cosbey, Renewable energy subsidies and the WTO: The wrong law 
and the wrong venue, SUBSIDY WATCH (Int’l Inst. For Sustainable Dev.), 
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If, as claimed by the authors mentioned above, the desirability of climate-related 
subsidies cannot by itself serve as a justification for these under trade law, the next 
level of this analysis should focus on whether these subsidies could be successfully 
challenged under the WTO. The next part of the article will evaluate certain types 
of climate change support schemes and their compatibility with the rules of the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM 
Agreement”).26 
C. The SCM Agreement and climate change policies: Possible conflicts 
1. The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
 
Are the schemes reviewed above ‘lawful’ under the WTO’s laws on subsidies? 
According to Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, a ‘subsidy’ must include three 
elements. First, a relatively broad definition of financial contribution must be met. 
Article 1 lists several examples of what may be considered as a financial 
contribution, including- the transfer of funds or liabilities (including loan 
guarantees); foregone or uncollected governmental revenue (including tax credits); 
and the provision of goods and services other than infrastructure. Second, the 
financial contribution should be granted by a government, or by a public body 
within the territory of the state. Third, the financial contribution must be viewed as 
a ‘benefit’. WTO jurisprudence has interpreted the term ‘benefit’ as more 
advantageous conditions than those that would have prevailed under ordinary 
market conditions.27 However, as mentioned by some, in an already distorted 
market such as the energy market, it is often difficult to determine whether a 
benefit actually exists.28 The WTO Appellate Body in the Softwood Lumber dispute 
stated (with respect to the local Canadian timber market) that when determining 
‘benefit’, the investigating authority “may use a benchmark other than private 
prices in the country of provision […] if it is first established that private prices in 
that country are distorted because of the government's predominant role in 
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.globalsubsidies.org/subsidy-watch/commentary/renewable-energy-subsidies-
and-wto-wrong-law-and-wrong-venue; Alan O. Sykes, The Questionable Case for Subsidies 
Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, STANFORD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, L. & ECON. 
RES. PAPER SERIES, 24    (2009), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1444605 [hereinafter Sykes]. 
26 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, April 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 
[hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
27 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, 157 
WT/DS70/AB/R (1999), [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Canada-Civilian Aircraft].  
28 Howse, supra note 18, at 5, 6; Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, Incentive schemes to promote renewables and the 
WTO law of subsidies, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION AND THE MITIGATION OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE 155, 161 (Thomas Cottier, et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Sadeq Z. 
Bigdeli]; Sykes, supra note 25.  
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providing those goods.”29   
The SCM Agreement covers two types of subsidies: The first group comprises 
‘prohibited subsidies’, which are either contingent on export performance (“export 
subsidies”), or on the use of domestic goods. The second group includes 
‘actionable subsidies’.30 When these subsidies are specific, and adversely affect the 
economy of other WTO Member States, they may be challenged by affected 
Member States. ‘Specificity’, in the context of the SCM Agreement, can be either de 
jure or de facto.31 As analysed by Bigdeli, the ‘specificity’ requirement has been 
interpreted very broadly by the WTO DSB, and can include a large number of 
industries (like the RE sector, for instance).32 ‘Adverse effect’, according to the 
SCM Agreement, can be found where the domestic industry of another state is 
injured, where benefits achieved by other states through trade concessions are 
being impaired, or where there is serious prejudice to the interest of another 
state.33   
Originally, a third group of ‘non-actionable’ subsidies was also covered by the SCM 
Agreement. Under this category certain subsidies were permitted. This included 
subsidies granted for research activity (including research activity conducted by 
private firms) and assistance to firms’ adaptation efforts to new environmental 
requirements imposed by regulation.34 However, these exceptions are no longer 
valid since the end of 1999.35 
Where the existence of a ‘subsidy’ is established in accordance with the conditions 
mentioned above, adversely affected states can bring a case against the subsidising 
state before the WTO DSB and ask for the removal of the subsidy.36 Alternatively, 
an injured state may also unilaterally impose countervailing duties, according to the 
rules set out by the SCM Agreement.37 
 
                                                     
29 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to 
certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 90, WT/DS257/AB/RW (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter 
Appellate Body Report, United States Softwood Lumber]. 
30 SCM Agreement, supra note 26, Part III.  
31 Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement states that also de facto specific subsidies should be 
considered as ‘specific’.  
32 Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, supra note 28, at 179, 180.  
33 SCM Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5. 
34 SCM Agreement, supra note 26, art. 8. 
35 SCM Agreement, supra note 26, art. 31.  
36 SCM Agreement, supra note 26, art. 4.  
37 SCM Agreement, supra note 26, Part V.  
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2. Ex-green light subsidies: Subsidies for research and development, and 
assistance to promote adaptation to new environmental regulation 
 
Until its expiration in January 2000, Article 8 of the SCM Agreement included a list 
of ‘non-actionable’ subsidies (or ‘green-light’ subsidies, or ‘exceptions’). Most 
notably, this list included an exemption for certain kinds of expenditures on 
research and development (“R&D”),38 and for subsidies aimed at assisting 
domestic industry to adapt to environmental regulation.39 However, these 
exceptions expired at the beginning of 2000, and as no alternative provisions have 
been put forward in order to address these issues, these types of subsidies are 
currently actionable under WTO law.  
The expiration of these exemptions is highly relevant for this analysis. There is 
currently a great need for investment in climate-related R&D. It is widely accepted 
that combating the adverse effects of climate change depends on the development 
of a wide range of new and existing technologies,40 most notably in fields such as 
energy efficiency, RE, carbon capture and storage,41 crop management, forestry 
and transportation.42 However, due to current market conditions, private investors 
                                                     
38 SCM Agreement, supra note 26, art. 8.2.a. 
39 SCM Agreement, supra note 26, art. 8.2.c. 
40 According to the IEA, the use of existing and new technologies can halve the world’s 
CO2 emissions by 2050; see Energy Technology Perspectives 2010: Scenarios & Strategies to 2050 - 
Executive Summary, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, 5 (2010), 
http://www.iea.org/techno/etp/etp10/English.pdf; for similar conclusions, see Climate 
Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, 218, 219 (2007),  
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_
wg3_report_mitigation_of_climate_change.htm [hereinafter IPCC 2007]; see also Brian 
Perusse et al., Melting Down and Scaling up: Stabilizing Climate Change by Promoting Private Sector 
Technology Development, 26(4) REV. POL’Y RES. 511 (2009); Jon Creyts, et al., Reducing U.S. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: How Much at What Cost?, MCKINSEY & CO., 34 (2007), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/sustainability/latest_thinking/ 
reducing_us_greenhouse_gas_emissions [hereinafter McKinsey Report, 2007].  
41 For a more detailed review, see IPCC 2007, id. at 218.  
42 Fact sheet: A technology revolution to address climate change, UNFCCC (2010), 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/application/pdf/fact_sheet_a_technology_revol
ution_to_address_climate_change.pdf; Thomas L. Brewer, International Energy Technology 
Transfers for Climate Change Mitigation: What, who, how, why, when, where, how much… and the 
Implication for International Institutional Architecture, (CESifo Working Paper No. 2408, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1273516; see also Second 
synthesis report on technology needs identified by parties not included in Annex I to the 
Convention: Note by the secretariat, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice, 30th Sess., June 1-10, 2009, FCCC/SBSTA/2009/INF.1 (May 29, 2009), 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/sbsta/eng/inf01.pdf. 
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are deterred from investing in this field. Therefore, governments must intervene in 
order to overcome market failures and encourage technological advancement, by 
subsidising private R&D.43 But due to the expiration of Article 8, governments’ 
provision of such support is no longer free of restrictions and must follow the 
general conditions pertaining to subsidies by the SCM Agreement.  
Similarly, climate change regulation may cause uneven market conditions for local 
industry and impose high costs of adaptation. This situation may create political 
objections for environmental regulation due to projected loss of jobs and 
competitiveness. Subsidies, like those exempted by Article 8, are therefore 
necessary in order to level the international economic ‘playing field’, especially in 
light of the political trade-offs often necessary in order to pass environmental 
regulation. Yet, such subsidies are no longer exempted from the SCM Agreement. 
  
This brings us to the question of whether the expiration of Article 8 results in 
conflicts between WTO law and the objectives of climate change policies? In order 
to validate the proposition that a potential for conflicts does exist in these cases, it 
must first be demonstrated that the above described ‘ex-green light’ subsidies 
could be successfully challenged before trade tribunals. Therefore, it must be 
affirmed that these subsidies are indeed ‘specific’, and adversely affect other 
Member States. 
i. Specificity  
 
In order to be considered as ‘specific’, a subsidy need not be granted to one 
specific producer alone, but may be distributed to a group of enterprises or 
industries (or as defined by the SCM Agreement, “certain enterprises”).44 
Trebilcock mentions in this respect that it is currently unclear exactly how small a 
group of industries must be in order to be considered as ‘specific’. 45 In addition, 
he believes that there is an “element of arbitrariness” in this decision.46 For 
instance, with respect to RE, Bigdeli argues that in most cases the existence of 
specificity is rather straightforward.47 This is due to the relatively small size of this 
                                                     
43 The reader should note that according to some, under certain circumstances, R&D 
subsidies can also have negative impact on issues such as technology transfer; see Howse, 
supra note 18, at 7. 
44 SCM Agreement, supra note 26, art. 2. 
45 MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, UNDERSTANDING TRADE LAW 83 (Edward Elgar ed., 2011) 
[hereinafter TREBILCOCK]; see also LUCA RUBINI, THE DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY AND STATE 
AID: WTO  AND EC LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 368, 373 (2009); Andrew Green, 
Trade rules and climate change subsidies, 5(3) WORLD TRADE REV. 377, 399 (2006) [hereinafter 
Green]. 
46 TREBILCOCK, supra note 45. 
47 Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, supra note 2828, at 181; Green, supra note 45, at 400, 401. 
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sector, especially when regarded as a part of the much larger general energy sector. 
Bigdeli’s argument was recently supported by Rubini, who explains that even when 
the criteria for the subsidy are prima facie neutral (i.e. granted to a certain 
technology, or to certain uses rather than to a specific actor), the small size of the 
RE sector makes it de facto specific, and thus, ‘specificity’ will be easy to 
demonstrate.48 Rubini’s assertion was also supported by other scholars.49 It could 
therefore be that subsidies for R&D that are designed for the development of new 
RE technologies, will be regarded as ‘specific’.  
Further, subsidies aimed to assist domestic industry to adapt to environmental 
regulation may be considered as ‘specific’ under certain circumstances. For 
example, as part of its newly adopted carbon tax (intended to evolve into an ETS 
in the future), the Australian government has announced that it will distribute 
AUD 9.2 billion to emission-intensive trade-exposed industries, in order to assist 
its most polluting industries to cope with this regulation.50 According to several 
media publications, this subsidy will be allocated “particularly for steel makers and 
aluminium producers that export their goods.”51 Australia has also decided to 
allocate AUD 300 million to its steel industry, in order to encourage investment 
and innovation.52 While, it is difficult to predict whether the number of Australian 
subsidy recipients would be considered by WTO panels (were the policies to be 
challenged by another country) as ‘specific’, according to at least some 
commentators, it seems likely that it would be.53 Moreover, if a similar subsidy 
were distributed by a smaller state with less ‘emission-intensive-trade-exposed 
industries’, de facto ‘specificity’ would be established even more easily.54 
                                                     
48 Rubini, Ain’t wastin’ time, supra note 23. 
49 Nigel Banks et al., International trade and investment law and carbon management technologies, 13, 
14 (FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 618, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171054.  
50 Key points of the carbon price package, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 11, 2011, available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/key-points-of-the-carbon-price-
package-20110710-1h8j0.html; Securing a clean energy future: The Australian government’s climate 
change plan, AUSTL. GOV’T, 51 (2011),   
http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2012/ph240/aslani2/docs/CleanEnergyPlan-20120628-
3.pdf [hereinafter Securing a clean energy future].   
51 Australia releases rules for $9.2 bln CO2 price support, REUTERS, Feb. 28, 2012,  available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/28/australia-carbon-
idUSL4E8DS28M20120228 [hereinafter Australia rules on CO2 price support, REUTERS].  
52 Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme and Carbon Pricing Mechanism: Comparison, PARLIAMENT OF 
AUSTL., 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Li
brary/Browse_by_Topic/ClimateChange/cprs (last updated July 18, 2011). 
53 HUFBAUER, CHARNOVITZ & KIM, supra note 1. 
54 Green, supra note 45, at 400. 
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ii. Adverse effect 
 
The second question that must be asked is whether subsidies for R&D, or those 
aimed to assist domestic industry to adapt to environmental regulation, adversely 
affect other Member States. This question is economic in nature and would need 
to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. However, it is possible that they could be, 
at least in theory. Certain kinds of subsidies for R&D, especially industrial research 
and pre-competitive development activity, can clearly provide a benefit for 
participating firms, which may confer them with an economic advantage over 
foreign competitors acting on the global markets.  
It is more difficult to see how subsidies that are aimed at assisting domestic 
industry to adapt to environmental regulations can adversely affect foreign firms, 
as, in theory these subsidies should balance newly imposed costs on the domestic 
industry, and not create an advantage. Such a scenario however is not 
unimaginable, and depends on the nature of the subsidy, and on whether the 
subsidy indeed matches the industry’s expenses due to environmental regulation 
and does not exceed them. With respect to the Australian Clean Energy Plan, it 
was claimed by some that “the government’s proposed assistance is so generous 
that steel producers will receive an unjustified windfall gain”.55 Furthermore, as the 
Australian plan intends to support specifically “emissions-intensive, trade-exposed 
industries”,56 the possibility that the assistance granted to such “trade-exposed” 
industry will adversely affect foreign competitors is even more likely.   
Even where a subsidy does not exceed the costs of adaptation, it may indirectly 
confer a ‘benefit’ and adversely affect other states’ industry. For example, if a 
carbon tax is imposed on the sales of products based on their carbon footprints, 
assisting local industries to reduce their emission levels through subsidies will result 
in reduced carbon footprints, and consequently also with reduced taxation for such 
companies in the future. This will grant them an advantage vis-à-vis their foreign 
competitors which did not enjoy similar assistance, and consequently may have to 
pay higher carbon taxes. Such an advantage, may of course be enjoyed by 
subsidised companies throughout the world, wherever similar carbon taxes are 
applied, and not necessarily only in the company’s home state.   
In conclusion, at least theoretically, it seems possible that due to the expiration of 
the mentioned ‘green-light’ exceptions, these types of subsidies could be 
considered as actionable under certain conditions.  
                                                     
55 Tony Wood & Tristan Edis, New protectionism under carbon pricing: Case studies of LNG, coal 
mining and steel sectors, GRATTAN INST. (Sept. 2011), 
grattan.edu.au/static/files/assets/aaa39bf4/101_report_new_protectionism.pdf.   
56 Securing a clean energy future, supra note 50, at 54.  
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3. Carbon tax 
 
According to Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement, ‘subsidy’ also includes 
“government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected”. 
According to the Appellate Body, the term “government revenue that is otherwise 
due” refers to taxes collected by a certain state, from all actors who are in similar 
situations.57 Excluding one such actor (or a group of actors) from taxation 
therefore, will be considered as a ‘subsidy’. In the context of carbon tax, it should 
be asked whether the mere existence of different carbon footprints is enough to 
establish that two, otherwise similar actors, are in a ‘different situation’, and thus 
could be taxed differently. 
The question of whether environmental criteria may justify different treatment for 
two, otherwise similar products is in fact a much broader issue than the discussion 
over subsidies and touches on matters such as eco-labelling58 and non-
discrimination.59 In essence, this question is related to the highly debatable topic of 
non-product-related process and production methods (“non-product-related 
PPM”), i.e. whether the manner in which a product was produced can justify 
different treatment for otherwise similar products.  
The issue of PPM and its relation to climate change is beyond the scope of this 
research.60 In a nutshell however, it can be mentioned that in the Turtle-Shrimp case 
the AB seemed to indicate that non-product-related PPM is prohibited by WTO 
law, but under certain conditions may fall within the exceptions of Art. XX 
GATT.61 This indeed seems to be the traditional approach of the WTO law 
                                                     
57 Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” Article 
21.5, ¶ 98, WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2002), [hereinafter AB Report, United States – Tax 
Treatment]. 
58 Jasper Stein, The Legal Status of Eco-Labels and Product and Process Methods in the World Trade 
Organization, 1(4) AM. J. ECO. & BUS. ADMIN. 285 (2009); Arthur E. Appleton, Private climate 
change standards and labelling schemes under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, in 
Cottier et al. eds., supra note 28, at 131. 
59 Donald Regan, How to think about PPMs (and climate change), in Cottier et. al. eds., supra note 
28, at 97; Patrick Low, et. al, The interference between the trade and climate change regimes: Scoping the 
issues 6 (World Trade Org. – Econ. Research & Statistics Div., Staff Working Paper-ERSD-
2011-1, Jan. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201101_e.pdf [hereinafter Low et al.].   
60 For further discussion on this issue, see JASON POTTS, THE LEGALITY OF PPMS UNDER 
THE GATT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE TRADE POLICY (2008) 
[hereinafter JASON POTTS]; see also Australia rules on CO2 price support, REUTERS, supra note 
51. 
61 Appellate Body Report, United-States – Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products,  
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); see also JASON POTTS, id., at 21. 
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towards non-product-related PPM-based discrimination.62 However, the relevance 
of the Art. XX GATT exceptions for the SCM Agreement is highly doubtful, as 
such exceptions were not included in the SCM Agreement itself.63 Therefore, it 
could be that under the SCM Agreement differentiated treatment for low carbon 
products (i.e. lower taxation in this case) may not be justified. Although this 
conclusion was specifically confirmed by the Panel in the Canada FIT case,64 the 
AB in this case has left room to believe that PPM-based discrimination of 
otherwise ‘like’ products could in fact be justified when it comes to climate change-
related measures. When discussing the ‘likeness’ of RE and conventional energy, 
the AB stated:65 
“What constitutes a competitive relationship between products may 
require consideration of inputs and processes of production used to 
produce the product.” 
 
While the AB’s remark seems somewhat vague, its final ruling according to which 
the RE market is not the same as the conventional energy market66 supports the 
conclusion that PPMs-related considerations are indeed relevant with respect to 
climate change-related measures, and therefore, may justify differentiated 
treatment. In other words, the AB’s decision could be read as justifying the 
imposition of different pricing, tariffs, restrictions, taxes, etc., based on products’ 
carbon foot-prints. According to this approach, the imposition of carbon taxes 
cannot be considered as violating WTO law. 
i. Specificity and adverse effect 
 
With respect to the ‘specificity’ and the ‘adverse effects’ tests, the discussion 
presented above regarding the compatibility of the ex-“green light” subsidies with 
WTO law is relevant also in this case as well. When regarded as a part of the much 
larger general energy sector, it was argued by some that the RE sector can be 
considered as ‘specific’.67 The imposition of a carbon tax on energy production for 
example, may be problematic in this respect. This can be quite straightforward 
where the main domestic energy producer relies on RE (for example, in the 
                                                     
62 Low et al., supra note 59, at 5.  
63 See Rubini, Ain’t wastin’ time, supra note 23, at 562. 
64 The Panel stated in this case that as the physical properties of electricity are not affected 
by the methods in which it was generated, RE cannot be priced differently than fossil fuel-
based electricity; Panel Report, Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, 
WT/DS412/R, WT/DS426/R  (Dec. 19, 2012), [hereinafter Panel Report, Canada FIT].  
65 AB Report, Canada FIT, supra note 9, ¶ 5.63. 
66 AB Report, Canada FIT, supra note 9, ¶ 5.204.  
67 Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, supra note 28, at 181; Rubini, Ain’t Wwastin’ time, supra note 48, at 548, 
549. 
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Canadian Province of Quebec the main domestic energy producer is Hydro-
Quebec, which relies on hydro-power).68      
The evaluation of the ‘adverse effect’ element in this case depends on the specific 
circumstances of each case. But at least where international trade in electricity takes 
places, it is possible that those wishing to export fossil-fuel based energy to a state 
that taxes such energy will be adversely affected.           
4. Feed-in-tariffs (“FIT”) 
 
Can FIT programs be considered as an unlawful subsidy under the SCM 
Agreement? According to Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, a ‘subsidy’ must 
include a financial contribution that was granted either directly by the government, 
or alternatively, by any public body within the territory of this state. “Financial 
contribution” in this respect can also include that provided through the 
governmental purchase of goods.69 This can be linked to measures such as 
premiums or FIT programs, in cases where the state is committed to purchase the 
electricity generated by facilities benefiting from these subsidies.70 
The existence of a ‘financial contribution’ may seem evident where it is the 
government that purchases the electricity. However, where the power sector has 
been privatised the obligation to purchase electricity is imposed on private 
companies. Should such a situation be regarded as a ‘financial contribution’? In the 
PreussenElektra AG case, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has given an 
answer to this question in accordance with EU law.71 It was argued in this case that 
the obligation (imposed on private firms) to purchase wind power electricity at 
above market-value prices, constituted a state aid. The ECJ however, considered 
the ‘transfer of a state resource’ as a condition for the existence of ‘state aid’, and 
specified that as no transfer of a state resource took place in this case, no ‘state aid’ 
was granted.72  
Unlike EU law, the SCM Agreement’s definition of ‘subsidy’ does include a 
situation in which private firms are instructed to perform a task that is “normally 
[be] vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from 
                                                     
68 See Quebec: Energy Facts and Statistics, CTR. FOR ENERGY, 
http://www.centreforenergy.com/factsstats/mapscanada/qc-energymap.asp. 
69 SCM Agreement, supra note 26, art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii). 
70 Robert Howse & Antonia Eliason, Countervailing Duties and Subsidies for Climate Mitigation: 
What Is and What Is Not, WTO Compatible?, in CLIMATE FINANCE: REGULATORY AND 
FUNDING STRATEGIES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 259, 264 
(Richard B. Stewart, Benedict Kingsbury & Bryce Rudyk eds., 2009).    
71 Case 379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG, 2001 E.C.R. I-02099. 
72 Id.  ¶¶ 56, 67. 
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practices normally followed by governments”.73 The transfer of a ‘state resource’ in 
this respect is therefore less relevant under WTO law. Therefore, had the 
PreussenElektra AG case been adjudicated before the WTO DSB, the relevant 
question would not have been whether a ‘state resource’ has been transferred, but 
rather whether the purchase of electricity is a task that is normally performed by a 
government. As in many states the purchasing of electricity is indeed performed by 
the state, and in light of the fact that even where the power sector has been 
privatised it is still heavily regulated by the state (i.e. the state still bears 
responsibility), it is likely that the existence of a ‘financial contribution’ would have 
been established in this case. 
In the dispute between the EU, Japan and Canada concerning the FIT program 
applied by the Canadian Province of Ontario (“Canada FIT case”),74 all the parties 
seem to have accepted that FIT programs indeed include a ‘financial contribution’ 
component. The parties however, did not agree on its exact legal characterisation. 
While the complainants argued that the FIT should be described as a ‘direct 
transfer of funds’ (Art. 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the SCM Agreement), Canada argued that it 
should be described as a ‘governmental purchase of goods’ (Art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the 
SCM Agreement). The implication of the exact legal characterisation is not relevant 
for the determination of ‘financial contribution’, but, as discussed in more detail 
below, it affects the result of another important legal test – the existence of a 
‘benefit’. The Panel in this case accepted Canada’s view and defined the FIT 
program as a governmental purchase of goods, as defined in Art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of 
the SCM Agreement.75  
However, can prices provided by such programs be regarded as ‘benefits’? At least 
prima facie, the existence of a ‘benefit’ seems straight forward. In most cases, 
support schemes are in fact designed to provide conditions that are better than 
those available in the markets, in order to encourage RE producers. However, the 
WTO AB has stated in the past that other benchmarks, besides private market 
prices, may be used where markets are distorted due to a “government's 
predominant role in providing those goods”.76  With respect to RE, it could well be 
argued that prices are distorted due to the “government’s predominant role”, as 
governments tend to subsidise fossil fuels and thus artificially reduce the market’s 
price for energy. If such a claim were to be accepted, the benchmark for the 
‘market price’, according to which the existence of a ‘benefit’ is calculated, would 
                                                     
73 See Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv): “a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or 
entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions 
illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the 
practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments.” 
74 Panel Report, Canada FIT, supra note 74. 
75 Id.  ¶ 7.222.  
76 Appellate Body Report, United States Softwood Lumber, supra note 29. 
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probably be higher. The existence of a ‘benefit’ in this case, should be evaluated 
according to this newly modified price, and the specific price paid by the 
government in each case. Indeed the finding of ‘benefit’ stood at the heart of the 
Canada FIT case and is described in more detail in part II(D)(1). 
i. Specificity and adverse effect      
If a FIT is to be considered as an actionable ‘subsidy’ under the SCM Agreement, 
in order to be successfully challenged it must also be ‘specific’, and adversely affect 
other Member States. As already discussed above, according to some, a FIT can be 
considered as ‘specific’ due to the relatively small size of the RE sector, especially 
when regarded as a part of the general energy sector.77  
With respect to the adverse effects created by a FIT in one or more other Member 
State(s), this is an economic question and would need to be answered on a case-by-
case basis. However, where trade in electricity takes place between two countries,78 
subsidising the production of RE in one state can potentially adversely affect the 
importation of electricity from abroad. Furthermore, it could be suggested that 
energy producers are also developing new technologies or producing relevant 
machinery, and therefore, by subsidising their energy production the state is 
indirectly subsidising also the production of other, more easily exported goods. 
The exportation of these, as demonstrated in the U.S.-China dispute,79 can be 
considered as adversely affecting other WTO Member States. 
5. Emission trading schemes 
 
Another point in which the objectives of climate change mitigation and WTO law 
on subsidies may conflict is the application of an emission trading scheme 
(“ETS”). The introduction of such schemes inherently imposes additional costs on 
local industry. In order to compensate for these costs, or to allow local industry 
more time to adjust and to maintain competitiveness, states may allocate free 
allowances to existing actors (“grandfathering”).80 For example, Australia has 
announced that it will distribute AUD 9.2 billion in free carbon permits to trade-
exposed polluting industries, in order to allow these industries to maintain their 
                                                     
77 Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, supra note 28, at 181.  
78 Canada for instance, is selling electricity to the U.S. Close to USD 4 billion worth of 
electricity was sold in 2008 alone. See Stéphane Bordeleau, Where Canada’s surplus energy goes, 
CBC NEWS, Mar. 30, 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/03/17/f-power-
2020-provincial-energy-export.html.   
79 See infra Part II(D)(2). 
80 For example, according to the EU ETS, not all sectors are covered, and a large 
percentage of the allowances are to be distributed freely. See Council Directive 2003/87, 
2004 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC).  
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competitiveness.81 This situation has however already been discussed in other parts 
of this article previously.82  
The first question to be answered is whether ‘grandfathering’ should be regarded 
as conferring a ‘subsidy’. According to Nash, free allocations (or exemptions) of 
pollution allowances are equivalent to direct subsidies, and are in fact “tantamount 
to printing and distributing money to polluters” as recipients can sell these 
allowances on carbon markets.83 Furthermore, ‘grandfathering’ can be seen as a 
clear advantage to existing (often local) actors over new entrants, who will have to 
purchase their allowances and endure higher costs.84 This situation may be 
regarded as a discriminating taxation against those who were not ‘grandfathered’, 
and thus could be considered as a ‘subsidy’. Other authors have indeed agreed that 
it is most likely that trade panels will consider the free allocation of carbon permits 
as ‘subsidies’.85 
i. Specificity and adverse effect   
In order to be successfully challenged under the SCM Agreement, subsidies must 
be specific and adversely affect foreign competition. With respect to adverse effect, 
it can be claimed that due to “grandfathering” it is more difficult for new entrants 
to operate in these markets, and therefore foreign firms might be adversely 
affected. The existence of specificity however, depends on the details of the ETS. 
The early stages of the EU ETS for example, dictated the free allocation of 90-
95% of the allowances, a situation that can hardly be described as ‘specific’. 
However, as discussed above with respect to the Australian ETS (see further the 
discussion above under ‘ex-green light’ subsidies), where only a limited group of 
actors are receiving free allowances, this possibility does exist.  
6. Subsidies for biofuels 
The regulation of biofuels’ subsidies is another field in which the interaction 
between trade and climate change objectives may be relevant for this analysis. As 
this issue is complex in nature, only a short overview of the support schemes 
provided by states to biofuels producers and the legal framework regulating this 
field is provided. A more detailed overview of this topic is beyond the scope of 
this study and may be found elsewhere.86  
                                                     
81 Australia rules on CO2 price support, REUTERS, supra note 51; Securing a clean energy future, supra 
note 500, at 55. 
82 See supra Part II(C)(2).  
83 Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market: Conflicts between Tradable Pollution Allowance and the 
Polluters Pays Principle, 24(2) HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 505 (2000). 
84 Id. 
85 HUFBAUER, CHARNOVITZ & KIM, supra note 1, at 62. 
86 For detailed review, see Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, supra note 28; Toni Harmer, Biofuels subsidies and 
the law of the WTO, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., 5 (June 2009), 
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When discussing the legal framework of biofuels’ subsidies, it is important first to 
notice that it is not entirely clear whether biofuels are covered by the SCM 
Agreement (as ‘industrial goods’), or the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
(“AoA”).87 The U.S., for example, has defined biofuels as industrial goods (under 
the heading ‘energy and fuels’), which are covered by the SCM Agreement.88 
According to others however, at least certain types of biofuels (like ethanol89) are 
clearly covered by the AoA.90 It was claimed in this respect that while first 
generation biofuels can undoubtedly be characterised as derived from agricultural 
products (e.g. corn, soy, sugar). It is not clear at all whether the same can be 
claimed about second (based on non-edible crops, e.g. jatropha-based) and third 
(e.g. algae-based) generations of biofuels.91 Some biofuels, like biodiesel, are clearly 
placed under the SCM Agreement.92 
The question of classification is important as the rules of the SCM and the AoA 
agreements differ in nature. For example, unlike the SCM Agreement, the AoA 
does include ‘green box’ exceptions which exclude some subsidies from reduction 
commitments. For instance, among other types of permitted programs, Annex 2 of 
the AoA specifically mentions: “research, including general research, research in 
connection with environmental programs, and research programs relating to 
particular products”.93 However, as direct price support for producers remains 
prohibited, the value of this exception is rather limited.94 The use of the AoA’s 
‘green box’ exceptions is further restricted by other conditions. They must not 
distort international trade and they must be provided by a governmental funded 
program.95 
There are many examples of biofuel support schemes.96 The terms of each scheme 
may be different, and therefore their compatibility with WTO law may vary. In the 
                                                                                                                                  
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2012/02/biofuels-subsidies-and-the-law-of-the-wto.pdf 
[hereinafter Harmer]; Stephanie Switzer & Joseph McMahon, EU Biofuels Policy – Raising the 
Question of WTO Compatibility, 60(3) INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 713, 719 (2011) [hereinafter 
Switzer & McMahon]. 
87 Agreement on Agriculture, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1144 [hereinafter Agreement on 
Agriculture]. 
88 Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, supra note 28, at 173. 
89 See Annex 1 to the Agreement on Agriculture (ethanol is classified under HS 22). See 
Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, supra note 28, at 172, 173. 
90 Harmer, supra note 86; Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, supra note 28, at 173, 174.  
91 Switzer & McMahon, supra note 86. 
92 Biodiesel is classified under chapter 38 of the HS Code (HS 382490). 
93 Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 87, ¶ 2(a), Annex 2. 
94 Harmer, supra note 86, at 10. 
95 Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 87, Annex 2. 
96 For a detailed review, see Harmer, supra note 86, at Annex I. 
366                                        Trade, Law and Development                           [Vol. 5: 344 
 
U.S., federal tax credits for blending biofuels have been used extensively.97 Tax 
credits can be considered as ‘subsidies’ according to the SCM Agreement (which 
also covers uncollected government revenue). Other forms of government support 
that are being used include, inter alia, operating grants based on production output, 
loans, loan guarantees, feedstock subsidies and blending obligations. Depending on 
the exact details of each program, the vast majority of these schemes can 
potentially be considered as conferring a ‘subsidy’ according to the SCM 
Agreement. 
Several authors have claimed that at least some of these subsidies can be 
successfully challenged under the SCM Agreement.98 Again, such a determination 
would depend on the exact details of each support scheme, and these vary to a 
great extent. For example, Kerr & Loppacher argue that a former U.S. subsidy 
granted to biofuel refiners that was contingent on the use of soybean oil could 
have been regarded as a prohibited subsidy, as at the time soybeans were grown 
mainly in the U.S. and therefore the subsidy could be regarded as contingent on 
the use of local content and thus prohibited according to Art. 3.1(b) of the SCM 
Agreement.99 A similar argument was made recently by Argentina concerning the 
sustainability criteria adopted by the EU.100 It was argued, inter alia, that the EU’s 
decision according to which, soybean-based biodiesel (which Argentina exports to 
the EU in large volumes) does not qualify as ‘sustainable’, de facto supports EU 
biofuel producers, and thus should be regarded as contingent on the use of local 
content.101  
Sustainability criteria could also be challenged more directly, based on their raison 
d'être. Sustainability issues were raised following the increased use of biofuels, often 
argued to result in increased food prices and deforestation. Second generation 
biofuels are therefore being developed in order to address many of these ethical 
and environmental problems. Problems with respect to the WTO law on subsidies 
may arise where, for example, second generation biofuels are taxed at lower rates 
than first generation biofuels, because chemically the final products are identical, 
and the only way to differentiate the two is on the basis of how they were 
                                                     
97 Harmer, supra note 86, at 8, 9. 
98 Harmer, supra note 86 at 8-12; William Kerr & Laura Loppacher, Trading Biofuels – Will 
International Trade Be a Constraint? 5 CURRENT AGRIC., FOOD & RESOURCE ISSUES 50, 52 
(2005), available at http://caes.usask.ca/cafri/search/archive/2005-kerr6-1.pdf; Phoenix 
Cai, Think Big and Ignore the Law: U.S. Corn and Ethanol Subsidies and WTO Law, 40(3) GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 865 (2009); Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, supra note 28, at 183.  
99 Kerr & Loppacher, id. at 52. 
100 EU Biofuels, supra note 1, at 6.  
101 Id.  
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processed and produced, i.e. via a PPM-based measure.102  
At the moment it is not clear whether it would be accepted that the two are not in 
a “similar situation”,103 and therefore the exemption of one type of biofuels from 
taxation might be considered as “government revenue that is otherwise due is 
foregone or not collected”, and therefore be considered as a ‘subsidy’.104 In the 
author’s view, the comment made by the AB in the Canada FIT case, according to 
which the “inputs and processes of production used to produce the product”105 are 
in fact relevant for the ‘like products’ test, may indicate that sustainability criteria 
should be considered as compatible with WTO law. This is so especially in light of 
the context in which sustainability criteria are often adopted, as a part of 
obligations to blend, or to purchase sustainable biofuel. These obligations can be 
connected to the government’s “choice of supply mix”,106 as well as to “supply-
side” factors (i.e. different production “costs and characteristics”107), which are the 
very elements on which the AB based its decision to differentiate RE from 
conventional types of energy in the Canada FIT case.   
i. Specificity and adverse effects  
 
Whether biofuel subsidies can be regarded as ‘specific’ depends on the 
circumstances of each market, and the exact details of each support scheme. The 
subsidisation of only certain biofuels for example, may be regarded as ‘specific’. 
Furthermore, if biofuels are to be considered as a part of the general energy 
market, it is likely that ‘specificity’ would be determined. 
Claims of adverse effects may also arise as a result of the application of 
sustainability standards to trade in biofuels. For example, certain producers of first 
generation biofuels may be adversely affected by current sustainability criteria. The 
American Soybean Association has already expressed concerns to the U.S. Trade 
Representative that soy bean exports to European states have “declined 
significantly” since the EU began to implement its sustainability criteria for 
biofuels.108  
                                                     
102 Andrew Mitchell & Christopher Tran, The consistency of the EU renewable energy directive with 
the WTO Agreements, ¶ 6 (Georgetown Bus., Econ. & Regulatory Law Research Paper No. 
1485549, Oct., 2009), available at 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1121&context=fwps_
papers. 
103 AB Report, United States – Tax Treatment, supra note 57. 
104 SCM Agreement, supra note 26, art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii). 
105 AB Report, Canada FIT, supra note 65, ¶ 5.63. 
106 Id.  ¶ 5.175. 
107 Id.  ¶ 5.174.  
108 AM. SOYBEAN ASS’N, supra note 4. 
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D. Current disputes under the WTO 
 
Part II(C) of this article includes mostly hypothetical conflicts i.e., scenarios in 
which trade disputes could potentially arise due to climate change regulation. 
However, in recent years it has become clear that such potential for disputes is 
quite real, as several international trade disputes related to climate change support 
schemes have been initiated by states. Not all of these disputes have resulted in 
WTO panel reports, or even in an official complaint.109 These incidents do, 
however, demonstrate that the potential for trade disputes in this field should 
indeed be taken seriously. The following part reviews two disputes that have 
recently made their way to the WTO DSB – The first involves the Canadian 
Province of Ontario’s FIT program, and the second China’s support schemes for 
the production of RE goods.         
1. The Canada FIT dispute 
 
In 2011, two WTO disputes (later merged into one case) were launched by Japan 
and the EU against the FIT program adopted by the province of Ontario in 
Canada.110 Both Japan and the EU argued that Ontario’s FIT program includes the 
allocation of subsidies contingent on the use of domestic goods, which is 
prohibited according to the SCM Agreement.  
Ontario’s FIT program guarantees high prices for the producers of clean energy, 
for a period of 20 years (40 years for hydropower). Unlike the German program 
that was disputed in the PreussenElektra AG case, this case concerns state 
controlled companies, most notably Hydro One, the largest transmission company 
in Ontario and owner of 96% of the transmission facilities in this province.111 The 
FIT program, as reported by the media, was considered as successful and attracted 
inter alia a USD 6.7 billion investment from Samsung for the purpose of building 
wind and solar power facilities.112  
Ontario’s objectives, however, were not only the promotion of green energy, but 
also the creation of jobs and the revitalisation of its domestic economy. The FIT 
                                                     
109 See for example, AM. SOYBEAN ASS’N, supra note 4; also see the Australian climate change 
regulation <AUTHOR: Please specify the particular regulation being referred to>.  
110 AB Report, Canda—Renewable Energy, supra note 9; AB Report, Canada FIT, supra note 9. 
111 Quick Facts, HYDRO ONE, 
http://www.hydroone.com/OurCompany/Pages/QuickFacts.aspx.  
112 Sustainable Prosperity, Domestic Content Requirement for Renewable Energy Manufacturing, 
SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY POL’Y BRIEF, 5 (Apr. 2012), 
http://www.sustainableprosperity.ca/dl789&display.  
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program was therefore also aimed at creating about 50,000 new jobs.113 In order to 
reach this objective a domestic content requirement was included in this program, 
according to which large installations are required to use a minimum domestic 
content of 25-60% (calculated upon expenditures on equipment, resources, 
services, etc.).114  
This case emphasises the connection between environmental and economic 
objectives, and the political trade-offs often necessary in order to achieve mutually 
beneficial policies. On the one hand, it could very well be that Canada’s subsidies 
are distorting the global market for environmental goods and services. On the 
other hand, it could also be that without such a ‘sacrifice’, the governmental 
resources invested in the promotion of clean energy would have been invested 
elsewhere. The green benefits in this respect, are highly contingent on the potential 
for domestic economic and social gains. Following the annulment of Ontario FIT 
program’s ‘local content’ requirement (due to the AB ruling described below115), 
Ontario decided to significantly cut its obligation to buy electricity from RE 
generators. This fact may be seen as supportive of this conclusion.116  
The implications of this case may have importance for other countries besides 
Canada, and may affect more than just economic or environmental interests. 
Recently it was reported that South-Africa is contemplating similar ‘local content’ 
rules for its own RE programs.117 According to this media report, the South 
African local content requirement is intended to support objectives “beyond the 
mere production of energy from renewable sources”, such as “the sustainable 
economic empowerment of all black people”.118 South Africa indeed placed 
“localisation targets” in several of its green economy plans, including a 35% local 
content requirement for solar water heaters by 2016, which is expected to increase 
                                                     
113 Global Subsidies Initiative, WTO subsidy dispute round-up, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.iisd.org/gsi/news/wto-subsidy-dispute-round-0. 
114 Id. 
115 AB Report – Canada FIT, supra note 9. 
116 Shaun Campbell, Ontario slashes Samsung deal following WTO ruling, WIND POWER 
MONTHLY, June 24, 2013, http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1187471/ontario-
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117 Happy Masondo, South Africa: What Is Contained In Local Content Under The Renewable 
Energy Procurement Programme?, MONDAQ, Apr. 5, 2012, 
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and the local content requirement in, WTI Advisors, Local Content Requirements & the Green 
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up to 75% in the future.119 As the use of ‘local content’ requirements is becoming 
increasingly popular in green economy strategies around the world,120 it is to be 
expected that such measures will be repeatedly challenged before the WTO also in 
the future.  
i. The Panel Report 
 
A Panel report was issued on 19 December 2012.121 The Panel did not directly 
address the local content requirement in the context of the SCM Agreement, as it 
decided that the complainants were not able to demonstrate that the FIT program 
should be considered as an actionable subsidy. The Panel agreed that the FIT 
program includes a ‘financial contribution’, as it involved the “governmental 
purchase of goods”,122 but was divided as to the second component of the 
definition of ‘subsidy’ - the existence of a ‘benefit’.     
The complainants in this case argued that the prices provided by Ontario were 
higher than those offered in the markets. In order to determine the market price, 
the complainants proposed several benchmarks. First, it was suggested that the 
wholesale/retail prices of electricity in Ontario could be used. Secondly, it was 
suggested that the prices in four other neighbouring jurisdictions (in which, it was 
argued, the electricity markets were not distorted) could be used.123 As a third 
alternative, it was suggested that the prices at which electricity was exported from, 
and imported to, Ontario, could serve as an indicator for the a genuine, non-
distorted market price.124  
The claimants further argued that without the FIT program, the RE generators 
would not have been commercially viable under the current market conditions, and 
therefore it should be accepted that this program is providing a ‘benefit’.125 Lastly, 
it was argued that the fact that the FIT program provided guarantees for 20 years 
of activity in itself constitutes a ‘benefit’, as such a guarantee is not otherwise 
available in the markets.126 
Canada on the other hand, argued that the correct benchmark for the 
determination of the ‘benefit’ component should not be the market prices 
provided by the complainants (which represent the general prices of energy, 
                                                     
119 WTI Advisors, id. at 41, 44.  
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121 Panel Report, Canada FIT, supra note 74. 
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regardless of source), but rather the market prices of RE alone.127 Canada also 
argued that the higher costs of production inherent in RE should be included in 
the calculation of such a benchmark.128 Lastly, it was argued by Canada that the 
general energy market is distorted to begin with, and therefore the prices provided 
by the complainants do not genuinely reflect ‘competitive market prices’.129 
The Panel rejected Canada’s argument that the determination of the market price 
benchmark should be in accordance with the RE market alone.130 First, as stated by 
the complainants (as well as by other third parties to this dispute131), consumers in 
Canada purchase electricity according to a ‘general’ electricity price (i.e. the price 
that represents a blend of all sources), and cannot in reality choose to pay the RE 
prices, as assumed by Canada. The RE energy market, in this respect, is completely 
theoretical. Secondly, according to WTO law where the final products are identical, 
the manner in which each was produced cannot serve as a justification for treating 
them differently. Therefore, the electricity produced from RE sources cannot be 
distinguished from electricity produced by non-renewable sources.     
However, the Panel rejected also the complainants’ arguments concerning the 
correct benchmark for the determination of a market price. It described in great 
length the fact that the energy market in Ontario is distorted, and therefore the 
market-prices relied upon by the complainants do not represent the correct 
benchmark for the determination of a ‘benefit’. The Panel also rejected the EU’s 
attempt to use the prices at which electricity was traded between Ontario and its 
neighbouring states/provinces as the right benchmark, as the EU failed to 
demonstrate that the prices in these provinces or U.S. states were not distorted as 
well.132 The Panel also rejected the comparison between Ontario and the four 
neighbouring provinces or states, in which, according to the complainants, free 
energy markets existed. The Panel explained that there were additional sources of 
revenues available to electricity generators in these territories,133 and that different 
conditions in these markets invalidate the comparison between them and 
Ontario’s.134 
Interestingly, the Panel also stated that even if a competitive market price would 
have been demonstrated, it cannot serve as the appropriate benchmark in such a 
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case.135 The reason for this is that where a competitive price exists, public policy 
objectives such as the diversification of energy sources and the reduction of GHG 
emissions (mentioned in the report only as “environmental impacts”), could not be 
achieved. 
The Panel’s rejection of the numerous benchmarks presented by the parties, as 
well as the use of the competitive market price benchmark in general, leaves the 
WTO Members wondering what should be the right benchmark for evaluating the 
existence of ‘benefit’ in similar cases. Indeed the EU has asked the Panel to 
identify the proper benchmark in such a case.136 The Panel made the following 
suggestion:137 
“one way we believe it is possible to evaluate whether the challenged 
measures confer a benefit, that at the same time maintains a market-based 
discipline, is by evaluating the commercial nature of the FIT and 
microFIT Contracts against the actions of private purchasers of electricity 
in a wholesale market where the conditions of supply and demand mirror 
those that currently exist in Ontario.”  
As part of the relevant conditions, the Panel mentions Ontario’s ambitious plans to 
eliminate coal-fired electricity plants, and Ontario’s decision that at least part of its 
future additional energy supply should be derived from RE sources. The 
complainants, according to the Panel, should have compared the FIT contracts to 
other commercial electricity contracts offered by distributers, acting under similar 
obligations to purchase electricity from RE sources.138  The Panel further suggests 
comparing the rate of return available under the FIT program with the cost of 
capital for other projects with a comparable risk profile.139 
Although the Panel refrained from evaluating the local-content requirement against 
the SCM Agreement, eventually it did find it incompatible with other WTO rules, 
namely the non-discrimination rules as prescribed by Article 2.1 of the TRIMs 
Agreement, and Article III:4, GATT. The national treatment rule and its relevance 
to climate change policies however are beyond the scope of this article, and the 
author will not elaborate on these issues.140 
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ii. The AB Report 
 
The Panel Report was appealed by both parties to this dispute and the matter was 
brought before the AB. Although the outcome of the AB decision was similar to 
that of the Panel, it strongly disagreed with the Panel’s interpretation of the SCM 
Agreement. The AB started by rejecting the Panel’s determination that non-
economic considerations, such as the necessity to promote investment in RE and 
protect the environment, are relevant for the ‘benefit’ test. It was explained that 
accepting such considerations as being relevant would be similar to creating an 
exception to the ‘benefit’ test.141  
The AB continued by also rejecting the Panel’s determination concerning the (non-
)existence of two separate energy markets. The AB ruled that the market for RE is 
separated from the market for conventional sources of energy, and therefore a 
‘benefit’ could not be evaluated in light of the lower, general prices paid for 
electricity in Ontario.142 The AB provided three reasons for this determination. 
First, the costs of RE production are significantly higher than those of traditional 
electricity.143 Second, there is no ‘market-intervention’, as the state in fact creates 
the market for RE (i.e. without state intervention there would be no market).144 
Lastly, the state is free to define its own supply-mix of electricity generation 
technologies145 (a decision that could be affected by environmental considerations), 
and such a decision cannot be considered as conferring a benefit.  
In the author’s view, the AB’s considerations are essentially not much different 
from the Panel’s approach, as they result from the same policy-objectives relied 
upon by the Panel. The reasons for the creation of the RE market, or for the 
state’s decision on its energy supply-mix, are in fact the implementation of the very 
policy-objectives stated by the Panel. Similarly, it is hard to imagine that without 
these policy-objectives the AB would have deemed higher production costs to be a 
sufficient reason for holding two, otherwise similar products, as competing in 
separate markets. In short, both the AB and the Panel seem to accept that the 
unique circumstances surrounding RE production justify an approach which de 
facto exempts RE from the rules applying to the general energy market.  
iii. Canada FIT: Conclusion 
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In the author’s view, both the Panel’s and the AB’s determination seem to bridge 
some of the difficulties inherent in the WTO law on subsidies with respect to 
climate change policies. Most notably, the Panel accepts that other non-economic 
factors should be evaluated as part of the relevant legal tests. Similarly, the AB 
accepts that elements such as the production method used for the generation of 
energy, and considerations such as the state’s right to choose its preferred supply-
mix of electricity, are all relevant for the legal analysis of the ‘benefit’ test. This can 
be seen as an evolution in the interpretation of the SCM Agreement, which prior 
to this case was described as operating in isolation from the motives for the 
subsidies,146 but now accepts policy-considerations such as the need to encourage 
RE generation. 
2. China-U.S. RE dispute(s) 
 
In December 2010, the US brought a complaint against China under the WTO, 
inter alia due to the latter’s “Special Fund for Wind Power Manufacturing” 
program.147 The Chinese program allegedly provided subsidies (according to some 
publications, between USD 6.7-22.5 billion148) that were contingent on the use of 
domestically manufactured components. Following the complaint made by the 
U.S., China cancelled this program and the case was discontinued.149  
Interestingly, however, China has argued that the subsidies mentioned were aimed 
at enhancing investment in R&D, a claim that may have been helpful if ‘green 
light’ exemptions had not expired. In a statement made by China’s mission to the 
WTO following the revocation of the Chinese measures, it was stated: 
“China noticed that the US had misunderstandings on the measure at 
issue, and has made clarifications in the consultations for this dispute, 
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[…]. The aim of the measure at issue is to enhance investments on 
research and development in wind power technology, but not to use 
domestic goods instead of imported goods.”150 
Several commentators have criticised the result of this case.151 It was argued for 
example, that while Chinese subsidies undeniably distorted the wind turbines 
market, they in fact levelled the playing field concerning a much more important 
competition – with the heavily subsidised fossil fuel-based energy.152 Others have 
added that instead of frustrating China’s heavy support for its domestic wind 
power industry, the U.S. would have done well to have levelled this playing field by 
increasing its own green investment.153 
Despite China’s revocation of the above mentioned scheme, the U.S.-China trade 
war is yet far from over. In December 2011, the U.S. Wind Tower Trade Coalition 
filed another petition to the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”), 
requesting that anti-dumping and countervailing duties’ investigations be 
conducted concerning alleged Chinese and Vietnamese subsidies on wind power 
equipment imported into the U.S.154 The complainants argued inter alia, that these 
subsidies are contingent on the use of domestic content and on an export 
requirement, and therefore should be regarded as prohibited under the SCM 
Agreement. On 30 May 2012, the U.S. Department of Commerce accepted the 
complaint and imposed countervailing duties of 13.7-26% on the above mentioned 
goods.155 On 27 July 2012, the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed further 
anti-dumping duties of 20.85-30.93% on wind power equipment manufactured by 
                                                     
150 As quoted in ICTSD, China to End Challenged Subsidies in Wind Power Case, INT’L. CTR. 
FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 13, 2011), 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/108435/.  
151 Watts, supra note 148; see also Kevin Gallagher, US should exercise green power, 
ENVIRONMENT BLOG – THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jan/06/china-
renewableenergy [hereinafter Gallagher]. 
152 Watts, supra note 148; Ronald Steenblik, Subsidies in the Traditional Energy Sector, in 
GLOBAL CHALLENGES AT THE INTERSECTION OF TRADE, ENERGY AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 183 (Joost Pauwelyn ed., 2010). 
153 Gallagher, supra note 151. 
154 U.S. Manufacturers of Utility Scale Wind Towers File Dumping and Subsidy Petitions Against 
China and Vietnam, WILEY REIN LLP (Dec. 29, 2011), 
http://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom.cfm?sp=newsreleases&id=701. 
155 Fact Sheet: Commerce Preliminary Finds Countervailing Subsidization of Imports of Utility Scale 
Wind Towers from the People’s Republic of China, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COM. 
(May 30, 2012), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-prc-towers-cvd-
prelim-20120530.pdf.  
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several Chinese companies.156 As a response, China has initiated its own 
investigation into U.S. support schemes and subsidies for its RE industry, and 
imposed anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties on U.S. exports of polysilicon 
(which is used for the production of solar panels).157 
Another complaint by solar panel manufactures was launched in the U.S. against 
China’s alleged subsidisation of its solar panels industry. This complaint was also 
successful and resulted in the imposition of anti-dumping duties of 31% on 
Chinese-made solar panels.158 It seems the US-China dispute is expanding. 
Following a complaint made by 25 European solar companies (headed by the same 
SolarWorld who led the U.S. proceedings), the EU Commission in September 
2012 has launched its own anti-subsidy and anti-dumping investigations 
concerning Chinese exports of solar equipment.159 The dispute between China and 
the EU however, has been amicably resolved for time being, as the two agreed that 
a minimum price will be imposed on the products of major Chinese firms.160  
On May 2012, this long-standing saga found its way again to the WTO. At the time 
of writing this article, China had submitted a ‘request for consultation’ (on 25 May 
2012) to the WTO with respect to, among other things, the above mentioned U.S. 
duties on its exports, and on 28 September 2012, a Panel was established.161  In its 
submission, China has contested the determination of the U.S. that the support 
granted to its industry constitutes a ‘subsidy’ according to the SCM Agreement. 
More specifically, China has claimed that the alleged subsidies were not granted by 
                                                     
156 Fact Sheet: Commerce Preliminary Finds Dumping of Imports of Utility Scale Wind Towers from the 
People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, INT’L. TRADE ADMIN., U.S. 
DEP’T. OF COM. (July 27, 2012), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-
china-vietnam-uswt-ad-prelim-20120727.pdf. 
157 China Levies 6.5% Tariff on U.S. Solar-Panel Materials, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323527004579079070572200630. 
158  Fact Sheet: Commerce Preliminarily Finds Dumping of Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, 
Whether or Not Assembled into Modules from the People’s Republic of China INT’L. TRADE ADMIN., 
U.S. DEP’T. OF COM. (May 17, 2012), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-prc-solar-cells-ad-prelim-
20120517.pdf. 
159 For the result of the anti-dumping investigation, Memorandum from the Eur. Comm’n 
on imposition of provisional anti-dumping duties on Chinese solar panels by EU (June 4, 
2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-497_en.htm; for details 
on the anti-subsidy investigation, see Memorandum from Eur. Comm’n, supra note 5. 
160 Press Release, European Commission, Commissioner De Gucht: “We found an 
amicable solution in the EU-China solar panels case that will lead to a new market 
equilibrium at sustainable prices” (July 26, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-729_en.htm [hereinafter EU Press Release from 26/07/2013].  
161 Unites States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/1 
(2012), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds437_e.htm. 
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a ‘public body’; that they were not ‘specific’, and that they did not confer a ‘benefit’ 
to their recipients. More details concerning China’s claims were not made available 
by the time this article was written. 
From what has emerged to date, the outcomes of these disputes are expected to 
negatively affect the sale and distribution of solar panels in important markets such 
as those of the U.S. and Europe. Due to the U.S’s imposition of countervailing 
duties on low-priced Chinese-subsidised solar panels, such panels are expected to 
become less popular among U.S. consumers. Chinese producers of solar panels 
have indeed stated (with respect to possible EU sanctions) that further trade 
measures will prevent them from maintaining low prices.162 Indeed US companies 
that install solar panels opposed the imposition of countervailing duties on 
Chinese-subsidised solar panels, as such duties were expected to reduce the 
installation of solar panels in the American market.163 Similar concerns were also 
expressed by European installation companies,164 and indeed research performed 
on this issue indicates that duties imposed on subsidised Chinese solar panels will 
result in the shrinking of the European photovoltaic market, and a decrease in the 
demand for solar panels installations.165 
III. WTO LAW ON SUBSIDIES AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE 
CHALLENGE: SETTLING THE DISSONANCE  
 
While it is evident that the WTO law on subsidies and climate change objectives 
are interlinked, the cases discussed in part II of this article demonstrate that this 
relationship includes many conflicting elements. At least legally, the result of the 
U.S.-China WTO dispute166 seems correct (i.e. the revocation of Chinese subsidies 
and the imposition of CVD and AD duties). However, while such an outcome may 
be compatible with economic theories related to free trade, it seems to conflict 
with climate change abatement objectives, which in fact require the immediate 
subsidisation of climate friendly goods, services and investment. Consequently, 
                                                     
162 Swetha Gopinath & Thyagaraju Adinarayan, Anti-dumping row casts shadow on Yingli, JA 
Solar outlook, REUTERS, Aug. 29, 2012, 
http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL4E8JT4I420120829?sp=true.  
163 Ucilia Wang, U.S. Solar Installers Oppose China Trade Complaint, FORBES, Nov. 8, 2011, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2011/11/08/solar-trade-dispute-over-china-
intensifies/. 
164 Solar panel duty on Chinese imports could cost UK billions, THE GUARDIAN,  Feb. 19, 2013, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/feb/19/solar-panel-duty-chinese-imports.  
165 Oliver Ehrentraut et al., The impact of anti-dumping and/or countervailing measures on imports of 
solar modules, cells and wafers from China on EU employment and value added, PROGNOS (Feb. 11, 
2013), http://www.solar-trade.org.uk/media/prognos%20report.pdf. 
166 China wind-power, supra note 147. 
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both the disputes described above, as well as the legal analysis performed by the 
author with respect to other climate change policies, demonstrate that the 
dissonance described in the first part of this article, is detrimental and must be 
resolved.   
In order to settle this dissonance, it could be that at least with respect to climate 
change, the WTO law on subsidies should not be based entirely on free market 
theories. This is mainly due to the unique features surrounding the problem of 
climate change, and the relevance of several non-commercial factors which must 
be taken into account.  
First, the problem of climate change is extremely urgent and requires immediate, 
heavy investment. Even if one is to assume that the free market’s ‘invisible hand’ 
will eventually make climate friendly technologies commercially-viable, such a 
process may take years to mature.167 The trade-off in this case is therefore clear. 
On the one hand, subsidies such as those granted by China, may result with the 
immediate “flooding” of the markets with low-priced equipment and 
infrastructure, followed by a speedy reduction of emissions. There will be an 
immediate increase in the deployment of climate change infrastructure (which will 
in fact secure long-termed reductions). Such an option however, is accompanied by 
hypothetical damage to long-term competition. On the other hand, prohibiting 
such subsidies could perhaps result in hypothetical long-term gains, which are only 
speculative at the moment, and may arrive too late for the planet. From the climate 
change policy-making perspective, the first option seems more desirable as it 
provides immediate and concrete action (rather than a vague promise provided by 
the second option), which is more compatible with the urgency of the climate 
change problem.  
Second, there is a political ‘tragedy of the commons’ element to climate change. 
Most politicians still consider climate change regulation as damaging for domestic 
economies’ competitiveness (and local employment), and therefore are unwilling to 
support significant climate change mitigation efforts. Political commitments for 
climate change efforts in this respect, may come only once the advantages for 
domestic economies have been secured. A level of ‘unfair’ competition therefore, 
seems to be inevitable in order to convince governments to act, especially in light 
of the weak prospect for significant multilateral action. This argument is especially 
relevant with respect to the highly controversial ‘local content’ requirements.168 
While most economists will probably find these requirements to be damaging for 
                                                     
167 Robert W. Fri, The Technological Challenge of Climate Change 40(3) THE BRIDGE: LINKING 
ENGINEERING AND SOC’Y 40 (2010), available at http://www.nae.edu/File.aspx?id=24518.  
168 For example, following the cancellation of the local content requirement due to the 
WTO AB’s decision, Ontario slashed its investment; see Campbell, supra note 116. 
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the long-term competition,169 it is hard to deny the added value of such when it 
comes to the political will to adopt support schemes in the first place, especially in 
times of economic difficulties. In other words, it could be that the choice in this 
respect is not between support schemes with no ‘local content’ requirements 
versus support schemes that include ‘local content’ requirements, but rather 
support schemes with ‘local content’ requirements, versus no support schemes at 
all. 
Third, a deviation from the current rules may be justified from an economic point 
of view as well. Indeed authors like Sykes,170 Hufbauer, Charnovitz & Kim,171 
argue that the regulation of subsidies focuses exclusively on the measure taken by a 
state, and is blind to any surrounding economic circumstances. There is no 
investigation of other state measures that may have imposed difficulties on 
domestic industries, or affect their competitive position in international markets.172 
As mentioned by the AB in the Canada FIT case, due to lack of competitiveness, 
much of the climate friendly industry cannot survive in free market conditions and 
requires subsidisation. Therefore the classic view of eliminating subsidies due to 
their distortive effect on free markets is simply not valid in this case, as without 
subsidies there will hardly be any market for these goods and services in the first 
place. 
In light of the above, the recent approaches deployed by both the Canada FIT 
Panel and the AB seem promising. If adopted in future cases, these could offer a 
practical resolution of some of the conflicting aspects described above, most 
notably to the “blindness” shown by the WTO law to the circumstances 
surrounding each subsidy, and the existence of non-economic considerations that 
must be taken into account. On the other hand, the impact of the approaches 
presented in this case is naturally limited and cannot influence the first and the 
second points described above. In this respect, the AB’s ruling will not change the 
result of disputes such as between the U.S. and China or the EU and China, nor 
can it legitimise taboos such as ‘local content’ requirements, which may be 
politically necessary.  
In the author’s view, a specialised regime that will balance the advantages of free 
trade, in light of the unique circumstances of the climate change issue may better 
                                                     
169 For a review of the arguments against local content requirements, see Jan-Christoph 
Kuntze & Tom Moerenhout, Local Content Requirements and the Renewable Energy Industry – A 
Good Match?, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., 7 (May, 2013),  
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2013/06/local-content-requirements-and-the-renewable-
energy-industry-a-good-match.pdf. 
170 Sykes, supra note 25. 
171 HUFBAUER, CHARNOVITZ & KIM, supra note 1, at 63, 64. 
172 Sykes, supra note 170170, at 24. 
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reflect the potential for mutual-supportiveness existing between international trade 
and climate change objectives. Through the adoption of such a balanced regime, 
the author believes that the dissonance displayed by this interaction, can be 
alleviated.  
For example, under such a specialised regime certain types of subsidies, mostly 
subsidies that are necessary for the correction of market failures, will be permitted. 
This, of course, will require a far more liberal approach towards the notion of 
subsidies. Such an approach for example, could include the consideration of such 
factors as those mentioned by the AB in the Canada FIT case, most notably the 
costs of production. Such an agreement could also revive the expired “green light” 
subsidies with respect to climate change alone, and even increase the scope of 
some of these exceptions, for example by removing any obstacles on climate-
friendly R&D subsidies.  
Furthermore, in the author’s view the use of ‘local content’ requirements should 
not be entirely banned. In light of the importance of ‘local content’ requirements 
as a measure to “sweeten the pill” of adopting support schemes in the first place, it 
could be argued that a limited amount of ‘domestic content’ conditions should be 
permitted. A specific percentage and a phase-out time frame could be agreed upon 
for the purpose of this rule.   
In order to reflect the advancement in climate friendly technologies, and as some 
of these technologies are expected to reach or already have reached, higher levels 
of commercial maturity, it could be agreed that such an agreement be limited to a 
specific period of time in order to allow the parties to re-evaluate the situation and 
re-negotiate accordingly.  
Lastly, in light of the urgency of the climate change problem, it could be that a 
more radical solution should be considered. For example, an ‘open season’ 
solution with respect to subsidies, limited for 3-6 years, could be beneficial for 
long-termed emission reductions. Removing all restrictions on subsidisation of the 
climate change industry may result in an ‘armament race’ between states. Each 
state will attempt to equip its own industry as best possible, before the 3-6 years 
window is closed. Such a solution will benefit from the current timing, as 
governments are highly inclined to make large investments in order to recover 
from the current economic slowdown.173  
                                                     
173 See concerning the increase in investment following the economic slowdown in, 
Stephen Orava, Incentives to stimulate renewable energy, in GLOBAL CHALLENGES AT THE 
INTERSECTION OF TRADE, ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 197 (Joost Pauwelyn ed., 
2010); concerning the need to invest in the current timing, see Dimitri Zenghelis, In praise of 
a green stimulus 5(1) WILEY INTERDISC. REV.: CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2014). 
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Such a solution would mirror the urgency embedded in the climate change 
problem, according to which substantive action must be taken immediately. 
Furthermore, the nature of climate change technology implies that such a massive, 
immediate investment would result in the immediate deployment of infrastructure, 
even if it would eventually frustrate the long-term competition in this field.  In 
turn, this would result in long-term environmental benefits. Simply put, the 
environmental benefits from a solar panel installed today may last for many years. 
The above suggestions require the amendment of the existing regulatory 
framework. However, in light of the difficulties to introduce meaningful changes 
into the WTO framework, and considering the fact that climate change is currently 
not even on the negotiations agenda, it could be that the most realistic way forward 
is the use of diplomatic, non-legal solutions, such as the application of political 
self-restraint by states (i.e. avoiding challenging one another’s support schemes, 
where possible174). 
Alternatively, recourse to more flexible diplomatic channels, such as the agreement 
reached by the EU and China, could also be used. The two parties agreed to 
replace EU duties on Chinese solar panels with an agreed minimum price. 
According to EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht, this will represent “a new 
market equilibrium at sustainable prices”.175 According to the EU Press Release, 
the minimum prices agreed on in this agreement will “take account of the 
particular and unique circumstances of the solar panel market” and are “intended 
to strike a balance between two key elements: it permits to remove the injurious 
dumping found and allows at the same time for a stable solar panel supply to the 
EU market.” In other words, the EU acknowledges in this agreement that the low 
prices of Chinese made panels are desirable, and should be balanced against the 
EU’s local industry’s interests. 
Similar flexible, creative attempts to resolve the current state of affairs are also 
being made in the U.S., where the Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) is 
currently promoting a compromise between the US and China in order to resolve 
the ongoing trade dispute.176 The SEIA draft recommendation is based on ending 
the use of trade remedies, and the establishment of a fund by Chinese 
                                                     
174 The author is aware that in certain jurisdictions, such a solution will not be possible due 
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175 EU Press Release from 26/07/2013, supra note 160. 
176 Draft Recommendation to Governments for the Establishment of a U.S.-China Solar Agreement 
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manufactures which will compensate the US industry.177  
Such bilateral solutions allow the parties to deviate from the existing rules and 
create a new framework, one in which external considerations (such as the 
importance of climate change abatement) as well as the unique circumstances 
surrounding this market, could be considered. In other words, it could be that the 
best way to settle this dissonance would be to avoid using the regulatory 
framework that created it in the first place. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This article demonstrates the existence of concrete, and theoretical, conflicts 
between certain laws of the WTO and climate change abatement objectives. At the 
heart of this fragmentation lies what seems to be best described as a dissonance: a 
free market based system (the WTO) that is asked to promote economically-
inefficient objectives (climate change abatement objectives). As this dissonance is 
detrimental to climate change policies, it is imperative that it should be settled. 
Settling it however, requires the making of significant legal reforms.  
The recent Canada FIT case represents the beginning of a significant breakthrough 
in overcoming the dissonance. Although the impact of the decision of the AB may 
be limited in scope, it represents an attempt to address the most common critique 
on the WTO law on subsidies, namely the “blindness” to the surrounding 
circumstances of each subsidy, and to the attainment of non-economic policy-
objectives. The agreement concluded between the EU and China represents 
another way in which states may bypass the difficulties imposed by the current 
regulatory framework. In the author’s view, these two developments may signify 
two parallel routes through which, eventually, the regulation of subsidies will be 
adjusted to cope with the climate change challenge and the subsidisation of RE. 
                                                     
177 This idea is based on a similar fund that was established in an agreement between the 
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